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Abstract 
 
This article combines theory and historical narratives to shed new light on the politics 
surrounding the making of central bank independence in contemporary Britain. Its 
central argument is that Gordon Brown’s decision to rewrite the British monetary 
constitution in May 1997 constituted an act of political manipulation in a Rikerian 
sense. The institutional change involved can be conceptualized as a heresthetic move, 
that is, structuring the process of the political game so you can win. The incoming 
government removed a difficult issue from the realm of party politics in order to 
signal competence and enforce internal discipline in the context of a government that 
was moving toward the right. But building on Elster’s constraint theory, the paper 
argues that the institutional reform was not a case of self-binding in an intentional 
sense. Rather, Brown adopted a precommitment strategy that was aimed at binding 
others, including members of his government. The reform had dual consequences: it 
was not only constraining, it was also enabling. The institutionalization of discipline 
enabled New Labour to achieve key economic and political goals. By revisiting the 
political rationality of precommitment, this paper questions the dominant credibility 
story underlying the choice of monetary and fiscal institutions.  
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‘The world has turned upside down. A Labour Government is elected and the new Chancellor's first 
move is to hand over control of macroeconomic policy to the Bank of England.’  
The Times, 7 May 1997 
 
‘One good way to understand the development of institutions is to analyze crucial turning points when 
people consciously try to change the way the institutions work.’ 
William Riker, ‘The Experience of Creating Institutions’, p. 122 
 
Introduction 
This paper looks at the politics surrounding a pivotal change in the rules of the game 
governing British political economy. On 6 May 1997, the newly elected Labour 
government surprised friends and foes by announcing that the power to set interest 
rates would be transferred from the Treasury to the Bank of England. Giving the 
Bank operational responsibility for setting interest rates should be seen as a seminal 
event. This momentous change in the ‘constitution of economic policy’1 was regarded 
by Tony Blair as ‘the biggest decision in economic policy-making since the war’.2 
Many commentators went further and argued that the move was ‘the most significant 
shake-up at the Bank of England in its 300-year history’.3 In hindsight, one might 
argue that central bank independence (CBI) in Britain was simply an idea whose time 
has come. Yet the paradox is that at the time nobody saw it coming. Although New 
Labour had signalled financial reform in its election manifesto, the issue was barely 
mentioned during the campaign. Indeed, ‘Brown got through fifty interviews and 
press conferences during the campaign without being seriously questioned over his 
plans for the Bank of England’.4 Even the most perceptive journalists were astonished 
by Brown’s bold and unexpected move.5 According to the Financial Times: 
 
‘Labour’s election manifesto had seemed to suggest this momentous change in the conduct of 
economic policy was on a fairly distant horizon’.6  
 
The adoption of central bank independence in Britain poses an explanatory puzzle:  if 
independence is supposed to enable a central bank to resist pressures from elected 
politicians, why might those politicians have an incentive to establish independent 
                                                 
1
 James Buchanan, ‘The Constitution of Economic Policy’, American Economic Review 3 (1997), 343-
50. 
2
 The Times, 7 May 1997. 
3
 Paul Routledge, Gordon Brown: The Biography (London: Pocket Books, 1998), p. 298. See also The 
Times, 7 May 1997; The Mirror, 7 May 1997.  
4
 Hugh Pym and Nick Kochan, Gordon Brown: The First Year in Power (Bloomsbury, 1998) p. 8.  
5
 William Keegan, The Prudence of Mr Gordon Brown (Chichester: Wiley, 2004), Robert Peston, 
Brown’s Britain (London: Short Books, 2005). 
6
 Financial Times, 7 May 1997. 
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central banks in the first place?7 Britain is a crucial empirical case for interpreting 
competing theories of monetary governance. As Michael King shows, this 
institutional change does not sit well with theories based on structural changes in the 
global financial system, economic competition among states, or external coercion by 
international financial institutions.8 More critically, this case defies the expectations 
of the partisan literature. This sweeping institutional reform was introduced by the 
Labour Party, which had nationalised the Bank in 1946, and whose constituents are 
not likely to prefer price stability over job creation. The Conservatives, the party 
representing business and financial interests, had resisted several attempts to 
introduce central bank independence in the period 1988-1997. This rapid 
constitutional transformation cannot be easily explained on the basis of existing 
theory such as North’s notion of ‘relative price shocks’ or Schofield’s concept of 
‘belief cascades’.9  
 
The aim of this article is to provide a political economy account of the origins of 
central bank independence in Britain. As a point of departure, I assume that to 
remove monetary policy from the political sphere is a political act.10 Given this 
assumption, this article stresses the strategic nature of institutional creation and 
assesses the role of political entrepreneurs in the process of institution-building. In 
particular, I will claim that William Riker’s notion of heresthetic is a useful analytical 
tool for understanding the logic of institutional formation. I will focus on two 
mechanisms which I suggest were at work in the thinking of the ‘founding fathers’.11 
First, building on Jon Elster’s reformulation of his original thesis on ‘Ulysses and the 
Sirens’,12 I will argue that precommitment strategies are about binding others rather 
than being acts of self-binding. Second, I will contend that institutional commitments 
                                                 
7
 John Goodman, ‘The Politics of Central Bank Independence’, Comparative Politics, 23 (1991): 329-
30; Kathleen McNamara, ‘Rational Fictions: Central Bank Independence and the Social Logic of 
Delegation’, West European Politics, 25(2002): 47-76.  
8
 Michael King, ‘Epistemic Communities and the Diffusion of Ideas: Central Bank Reform in the 
United Kingdom’, West European Politics, 28 (2005): 94-123. 
9
 Douglass North, Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990); Norman Schofield, ‘Evolution of the Constitution’, British 
Journal of Political Science, 32 (2002): 1-20. 
10
 Jon Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens: Studies in Rationality and Irrationality (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1979). 
11
 Following the convention in constitutional political economy, founding fathers refer to the core 
group of people playing a central role in the process of institutional framing.  
12
 Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound: Studies in Rationality, Precommitment and Constraints (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2000). 
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fulfil not only constraining functions, but also enabling ones. By revisiting the 
political rationality of precommitment, I will shed new light on the credibility story 
underpinning the making of CBI in Britain. My account challenges economic 
narratives based on the idea of self-binding and complements political narratives 
constructed around the influence of epistemic communities and the benefits of 
depoliticization.  
 
The paper proceeds by setting out an analytical narrative of Gordon Brown’s decision 
to grant operational independence to the Bank of England. An analytic narrative 
seeks to convert descriptive historical accounts into analytical ones by using 
theoretically relevant language. Its basic methodological assumption is that ‘theory 
linked to data is more powerful than either data or theory alone’.13 The data come 
from the abundant secondary literature on New Labour’s policies and politics. In line 
with McLean’s advice,14 the paper engages with the trade of the historian and 
analyses parliamentary debates, politicians’ biographies and memoirs, hundreds of 
newspaper articles and media reports, and a wealth of lectures and policy speeches 
given by the key actors involved in the process. But satisfactory answers to complex 
empirical puzzles depend not only on the evidence available, but also on what we 
bring into the analysis.15 Theory should guide empirical explorations.16  
 
Case studies are not always good for testing theories. However, they are good for 
uncovering missing mechanisms, developing new ideas, and dealing with causal 
complexity.17 This case study aims to contribute to the comparative literature on the 
political economy of monetary institutions.18 Econometric studies do not reach a 
                                                 
13
 Robert Bates, Avner Greif, Margaret Levi, Jean-Laurent Rosenthal and Barry Weingast, Analytic 
Narratives (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 3.  
14
 Iain McLean, Rational Choice and British Politics: An Analysis of Rhetoric and Manipulation from 
Peel to Blair (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001). 
15
 Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (2nd 
Edition) (New York: Longman, 1999).  
16
 Colin Hay, Political Analysis: A Critical Introduction (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2002). 
17
 Dietrich Rueschemeyer, ‘Can One or Few Cases Yield Theoretical Gains?’, in James Mahoney and 
Dietrich Rueschemeyer, eds, Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2003); Alexander George and Andrew Bennett, Case Studies and Theory 
Development in the Social Sciences (Cambridge Mass.: MIT Press, 2005); John Gerring, Case Study 
Research: Principles and Practices (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007). 
18
 See, e.g., William Bernhard, ‘A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence’, 
American Political Science Review, 92 (1998): 311-28; William Bernhard, Lawrence Broz and 
Williams Roberts Clark, eds, The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions (Cambridge, Mass.: The 
MIT Press, 2003); Jonathan Kirshner, Monetary Orders: Ambiguous Economics, Ubiquitous Politics 
(Cornell University Press, 2003); Bumba Mukherjee and David Singer, ‘Monetary Institutions, 
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consensus regarding the factors that determine the choice of monetary institutions, 
and cannot resolve disagreement about the precise processes by which politics affects 
the choice of these institutions.19 Theories of institutional change are still 
underdeveloped, and game-theoretic models of credibility are too abstract for dealing 
with the nuances of historical situations. Happily, there is a rich variety of sources for 
New Labour’s economic project, including the early move towards Bank 
independence. To date, few of these narratives have sought to draw implications from 
their observations of political behaviour. An analytically informed analysis of a 
seminal episode of institutional development may therefore have both empirical and 
theoretical value.  
 
This article proceeds as follows. The first section reviews political economy theories 
of central bank independence, seeking to identify the puzzles of the British case. The 
second presents the theoretical framework of this paper, drawing ideas from the 
works of Elster and Riker. The third section discusses the economic and political 
context of the institutional reform. The fourth section offers an analytical narrative of 
the origins of central bank independence in Britain. Key findings and implications of 
this research are summarized in the conclusion. 
                                                                                                                                           
Partisanship and Inflation Targeting’, International Organization, 62 (2008): 332-358; Michael Hall, 
‘Democracy and Floating Exchange Rates’, International Political Science Review, 29 (2008): 73-98. 
19
 Bernhard et al., ‘The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions’, p. 28. 
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Britain’s puzzling road to central bank independence  
What explains the choice of monetary institutions in general and independent central 
banks in particular? An established literature has looked at the costs and benefits of 
alternative monetary regimes from an economic perspective.20 The starting point of 
this approach is the macroeconomics of time-inconsistency. Time-inconsistency 
models point to the welfare losses that arise when a policy announced for some future 
period is no longer optimal when it is time to implement the policy. Economists have 
proposed institutional responses to the credible-commitment problem of time-
inconsistent plans. Following Kydland and Prescott, some scholars have advocated 
‘rules rather than discretion’ in the governance of monetary affairs.21 Others have 
observed that ‘credibility may be achieved by delegating powers to suitably designed 
institutions’.22 For example, Giavazzi and Pagano discussed the advantages of 
handing over power to a conservative foreign bank.23 In the same line, Rogoff argued 
that the right incentives could be generated by setting up an independent central bank 
that is staffed with inflation-averse officials.24  
 
It is often assumed that there is a strong economic case for insulating central banks 
from the influence of elected politicians. However, Kathleen McNamara argues that 
this conventional wisdom should not be taken for granted.25 On the one hand, some 
studies have found that high central bank independence (CBI) is correlated with low-
                                                 
20
 See, among others, Alberto Alesina, ‘Alternative Monetary Regimes: A Review Essay’, Journal of 
Monetary Economics, 21 (1988): 175-86; Alan Drazen, Political Economy in Macroeconomics 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000); Torsten Persson and Guido Tabellini, eds, Monetary 
and Fiscal Policy, Vol. 1: Credibility (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1994); Lawrence White, The 
Theory of Monetary Institutions (Malden: Blackwell Publishers, 1999). 
21
 Finn Kydland and Edward Prescott, ‘Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal 
Plans’, Journal of Political Economy 85(1977): 473-91. 
22
 Giandomenico Majone, ‘Public Policy and Administration: Ideas, Interests and Institutions’, in 
Robert Goodin and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, eds, A New Handbook of Political Science (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1997), at p. 61. 
23
 Francesco Giavazzi and Marco Pagano, ‘The Advantage of Tying One's Hands: EMS Discipline and 
Central Bank Credibility’, European Economic Review 32 (1988): 1055-82.  
24
 Kenneth Rogoff, ‘The Optimal Degree of Commitment to an Intermediate Monetary Target’, 
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 100 (1985): 1169-90. See also Alex Cukierman, Central Bank 
Strategy, Credibility and Independence: Theory and Evidence (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 
1992); Susanne Lohmann, ‘Optimal Commitment in Monetary Policy: Credibility versus Flexibility’, 
The American Economic Review, 82 (1992): 73-286; Alan Blinder, Central Banking in Theory and 
Practice (Cambridge, Mass.: The MIT Press, 1998). 
25
 McNamara, Rational Fictions. 
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inflation performance, often at no costs in terms of output stabilization.26 On the other 
hand, other scholars have shown that the apparent correlation between CBI and low 
inflation is not causal.27  In fact, it is highly sensitive to measures of independence, 
the time period chosen, and especially to the countries included in the sample.28 But 
even assuming that there is a strong economic case for choosing an independent 
central bank, the political logic of delegation remains a paradox.  If independent 
central banks did nothing but limit the ability of governments to manipulate monetary 
policy for their own short-term gain, governments would never choose an 
independent central bank.29  Delegation may be a way to achieving credible 
commitments.30  But the core question remains: ‘why did the same politicians who 
always preferred to have their hands on the monetary lever, suddenly opt to delegate 
such far-reaching powers to an independent technocratic institution?’31 
 
A body of research has exposed the limitations of the economic approach. This 
literature questions the apolitical nature of traditional optimal currency area and time-
inconsistency models, which rely on the unwarranted assumption that monetary 
choices are made by benevolent social planners motivated by welfare considerations. 
By neglecting the role of politics, the argument goes, approaches that focus solely on 
countries’ structures or expected economic performance have little explanatory power 
to account for the observed pattern of currency arrangements.32 Hence, a theory of 
monetary institutions should incorporate the ‘political incentives and constraints that 
                                                 
26
 Vittorio Grilli, Donato Masciandaro and Guido Tabellini, ‘Political and Monetary Institutions and 
Public Financial Policies in the Industrial Countries’, Economic Policy, 10 (1991): 342-92; Alberto 
Alesina and Lawrence Summers, ‘Central Bank Independence and Macroeconomic Performance: 
Some Comparative Evidence’, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, 25 (1993): 151-62; Alberto 
Alesina and Roberta Gatti, ‘Independent Central Banks: Low Inflation at No Cost?’ The American 
Economic Review, 85 (1995): 196-200.  
27
 Adam Posen, ‘Declarations Are Not Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank 
Independence’, NBER Macroeconomics Annual, 10 (1995): 253-74. 
28
 McNamara, Rational Fictions; James Forder, ‘Central Bank Independence: Reassessing the 
Measurements’, Journal of Economic Issues, 33 (1999): 23-40. Other authors have found a trade-off 
between inflation and real variables. See Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer, ‘How Independent a 
Central Bank Should Be? Working Papers in Applied Economic Theory 94-05 (1994), Federal Reserve 
Bank of San Francisco; Sylvester Eijffinger and Jakob De Haan, ‘The Political Economy of Central-
Bank Independence’, Special Papers in International Economics 19 (1996), Department of 
Economics, Princeton University. For a review of this literature see, Allan Drazen, Political Economy 
in Macroeconomics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2000).    
29
 McNamara, Rational Fictions, p. 7. 
30
 Fabrizio Gilardi, ‘The Same, But Different: Central Banks, Regulatory Agencies, and the Politics of 
Delegation to Independent Authorities’, Comparative European Politics, 5 (2007): 303-327.  
31
 Majone, Public Policy and Administration, p. 617. 
32
 Benjamin Cohen, The Geography of Money (New York: Cornell University Press, 1998). 
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shape governments’ decisions on monetary institutions’33 and acknowledge the fact 
that ‘monetary phenomena are always and everywhere political’.34  
 
Political economy accounts of variations in central bank independence can be divided 
into five groups of explanations. Firstly, institutional explanations claim that 
independent central banks tend to emerge in countries with a federal form of 
government and/or many veto players.35 Secondly, distributional or partisan 
explanations contend that central banks should be more independent in countries 
where anti-inflationary social interests are powerful, and that conservative parties, 
more concerned about inflation than unemployment and redistribution, should be 
more likely to support the institutionalization of price stability.36 However, an 
alternative and more counterintuitive partisan argument is that left-wing parties 
lacking anti-inflation credibility may choose CBI to signal a commitment to 
responsible economic policies.37 Thirdly, international ideational accounts suggest 
that, in the context of increasing economic openness and capital mobility, national 
politicians have been forced to grant CBI in order to achieve market confidence by 
reassuring international financial markets.38 According to this logic, the growing 
popularity of this regime is rooted in a process of social diffusion of (appropriate) 
organizational models led by influential epistemic communities.39 Fourthly, strategic 
explanations argue that political actors establish monetary commitments to lock in the 
policy preferences of the enacting coalition,40 address the problem of political 
                                                 
33
 Bernhard et al., The Political Economy of Monetary Institutions, p. 18. 
34
 Jonathan Kirshner, Monetary Orders, p. 3. 
35
 King Banaian, Leroy Laney and Thomas Willett, ‘Central Bank Independence: An International 
Comparison’, Economic Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas, March (1983): 1-13; Arend Lijphart, 
Patterns of Democracy (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1999); Mark Hallerberg, ‘Veto Players 
and the Choice of Monetary Institutions’, in Bernhard et al., The Political Economy of Monetary 
Institutions.  
36
 Goodman, ‘The Political Economy of Central Bank Independence; Posen, ‘Declarations Are Not 
Enough: Financial Sector Sources of Central Bank Independence’. 
37
 Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The Disadvantage of Tying Their Hands: On the Political Economy of 
Policy Commitments’, Economic Journal, 105 (1995): 1381-1402; Geoffrey Garrett, ‘Capital 
Mobility, Trade, and the Domestic Politics of Economic Policy’, International Organization, 49 
(1995): 657-87.  
38
 Sylvia Maxfield, Gatekeepers of Growth: The International Political Economy of Central Banking 
in Developing Countries (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997), Schamis (2003). 
39
 McNamara, Rational Fictions, p. 61. 
40
 John Goodman, Monetary Sovereignty: The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe (Ithaca: 
Cornell University Press, 1992); Susanne Lohmann, ‘Federalism and Central Bank Independence: The 
Politics of German Monetary Policy, 1957-92’, World Politics 50 (1998): 401-46; Delia Boylan, 
‘Preemptive Strike: Central Bank Reform in Chile’s Transition from Authoritarian Rule’, Comparative 
Politic,s 30 (1998): 443-62. 
9 
 
survival,41 or to make it possible to shift the blame when something goes wrong.42 
Finally, integrative approaches to the politics of central banking examine the 
interaction of international, national and micro-institutional incentives.43  
 
The British case appears to defy conventional theories regarding the adoption of 
central bank independence.44 To start with, governments of unitary countries with 
few veto players have little incentives to support a politically independent central 
bank.45 This case also contradicts partisan and interest-group explanations. While the 
Labour Party surprisingly instigated this flagship neo-liberal reform in 1997, the 
powerful City of London, which was meant to be among the key winners of this 
institutional change, did not take the lead in the constitution-making process. Given 
that decisions over interest rates were bound to have significant distributive effects, it 
is also striking that neither the business community nor the Bank of England itself 
actively lobbied for independence. Finally, the British experience is not consistent 
with the most popular strategic argument, which contends that monetary 
commitments are used to constrain future governments.  
 
At first glance, this case offers support to the hypothesis that politicians hand over 
policy tools to signal credibility to financial markets. Yet even though the binding 
implications of open markets featured strongly in the way the founding fathers 
perceived their own interests, the British road to independence was dominated by 
domestic considerations.46 King argues that while the diffusion of ideas through 
epistemic communities is the key mechanism explaining central bank reform in 
Britain,  ‘policy failure and paradigm innovation are insufficient conditions for the 
                                                 
41
 William Bernhard, Banking on Reform: Political Parties and Central Bank Independence in the 
Industrial Democracies (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2002); William Bernhard and 
David Leblang, ‘Political Parties and Monetary Commitments’, in Bernhard et al., The Political 
Economy of Monetary Institutions, pp. 111-38. 
42
 Cukierman, Central Bank Strategy, Credibility and Independence; Elster, Ulysses Unbound. 
43
 Lucia Quaglia, ‘An Integrative Approach to the Politics of Central Bank Independence: Lessons 
from Britain, Germany and Italy’, West European Politics, 28 (2005): 549-68; Lucia Quaglia, Central 
Banking Governance in the European Union: A Comparative Analysis (New York: Routledge, 2008). 
44
 Michael King, ‘Epistemic Communities and the Diffusion of Ideas’; Michael Tager, ‘Central Bank 
Independence: A Research Note on the Case of the United Kingdom’, The Social Science Journal, 44 
(2007), 359-66. 
45
 Mark Hallerberg, ‘Veto Players and the Choice of Monetary Institutions’, p. 95. 
46
 King, Epistemic Communities and the Diffusion of Ideas; Quaglia, ‘An Integrative Approach to the 
Politics of Central Bank Independence; Robert Elgie and Helen Thompson, The Politics of Central 
Banks (London: Routledge, 1998). 
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adoption of new ideas by politicians’.47 Politicians’ incentives for adopting ideas have 
to be accounted for. King’s argument is that ‘Bank of England independence 
provided electoral gains for New Labour by making the party more attractive to 
voters. In particular, this policy was designed to win the support of homeowners that 
represent the median voter in the British context’.48 King’s account is compelling, but 
it is not without problems. Had electoral considerations been central, the decision 
would have been taken before the election, not after. Moreover, the process of policy 
learning was less than straightforward. Ed Balls, for many the real intellectual father 
of the reform,49 used to believe that an independent central bank was the right 
instrument for ‘escaping’ rather than strengthening monetarism.50 
 
The move towards central bank independence was entirely consistent with one of the 
defining governing strategies of the Blair government, the politics of depoliticization. 
In a path-breaking work, Peter Burnham claimed that by granting operational 
independence in the area of monetary policy to the Bank of England, New Labour 
could off-load responsibility for unpopular policies and enhance its much-needed 
governing competence in the eyes of both markets and voters.51 Burnham correctly 
assumes that depoliticization is an intensely political process. He is also right in 
underlining the role of economic competence. However, our argument is that the 
founding fathers were  more interested in enforcing governing competence through 
time than in signalling economic responsibility. At the same time, it is likely that the 
blame avoidance argument has been overstated. Some scholars suggest that, given the 
British constitutional settlement, trying to shift the blame through policy delegation is 
not always the best strategy.52 There is little evidence suggesting that blame 
avoidance was a key motivation influencing this institutional change. King argues 
that ‘the British case supports the hypothesis that an epistemic community of 
monetary experts has the ability to influence policy if they can convince a key 
                                                 
47
 King, Epistemic Communities and the Diffusion of Ideas, p. 115. 
48
 King, Epistemic Communities and the Diffusion of Ideas, p. 115. 
49According to Peston, ‘the young Balls deserves as much credit –probably more- than anyone else for 
the creation of the modern Bank of England’. Peston, Brown’s Britain, p. 118. 
50
 Ed Balls, Euro-Monetarism: Was Britain Was Ensnared and How It Should Escape (London: Fabian 
Society, 1992). 
51
 Peter Burnham, ‘New Labour and the Politics of Depoliticisation’, British Journal of Politics and 
International Relations, 3 (2001): 127-49. See also Peter Burnham, ‘The Politicisation of Monetary 
Policy-Making in Postwar Britain’, British Politics, 2 (2007): 395-419; Jim Buller and Matthew 
Flinders, ‘The Domestic Origins of Depoliticisation in the Area of British Economic Policy’, British 
Journal of Politics and International Relations, 7 (2005): 526-44.  
52
 Elgie and Thompson, The Politics of Central Banks. 
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politician to champion this reform’.53 This implies that the incentives of those key 
politicians, the constitution-makers, should be at the centre of the analysis. Was the 
Bank of England reform really about signalling economic competence and appealing 
to the median voter? Was it really about shifting the blame for unpopular decisions? 
To what extent were the founding father constrained by the actions and expectations 
of influential epistemic communities? In short, what were the microfoundations of 
this radical institutional change?  
 
These reflections suggest that the political economy of monetary governance has a 
critical analytical gap, namely its isolation from the rich theoretical literature on 
institutions. It is striking, for example, that most scholars writing about the political 
economy of monetary institutions and the politics of central banking in Britain in 
particular make practically no reference to the works of leading political economists 
such as Douglass North and William Riker.54 In the next section, I will draw some 
lessons from the political of institutions research tradition.   
 
Analytical tools: heresthetic and constraint theory  
 
‘The key for understanding the process of change is the intentionality of the players enacting 
institutional change and their comprehension of the issues’ 
Douglass North, Understanding the Process of Economic Change, p. 3 
 
Why do institutions emerge? Rational-choice scholars conceptualize institutions as 
negotiated solutions to problems of coordination and cooperation.55 But we should 
not neglect an important part of the story: political institutions are also weapons of 
coercion and redistribution. They are the structural means by which political winners 
pursue their own interests, often at great expense to political losers.56 Institutions are 
not usually created to be socially efficient; they are created ‘to serve the interests of 
                                                 
53
 King, Epistemic Communities and the Diffusion of Ideas, p. 113, emphasis added. 
54
 Similarly, mentions to the works of Schofield, Shepsle, Tsebelis and Weingast are exceptional. 
55
 Robert Bates, ‘Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New Institutionalism’, Politics & 
Society, 16 (1988): 387-401, Randall Calvert, ‘The Rational Choice Theory of Social Institutions: 
Cooperation, Coordination and Communication’, in Jeffrey Banks and Eric Hanushek, eds, Modern 
Political Economy (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1995), pp. 216. 
56
 Terry Moe, ‘Political Institutions: The Neglected Side of the Story, Journal of Law, Economics, and 
Organizations, 6 (1990): 215-53, at p. 213. 
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those with bargaining power to create new rules’.57 Moreover, they are products of 
‘struggles among unequal actors’.58 If institutions have distributional effects, the 
‘politics of structural choice’59 should be rigorously investigated. If there is a 
systematic relationship between institutions and outcomes, a political actor ‘may 
operate on the cause in order to modify its effects’.60 In this context, the politics of 
institutional change can be analysed from the perspective of heresthetic.  
Heresthetic 
‘Heresthetic…may not happen as often as Riker claims, but when it does, it matters’  
Iain McLean, Rational Choice and British Politics, p. 556 
 
Heresthetic is the art of political manipulation. It is about ‘structuring the world so 
you can win’.61 This concept is used in electoral politics to describe the strategy of 
bringing about a new alternative to divide an existing majority, upsetting the 
prevailing equilibrium. As a case in point, Abraham Lincoln famously split and then 
defeated a solid Democratic majority by introducing a new dimension of political 
competition, that is, slavery. Political scientists mainly focus on the way electoral 
equilibria are broken by increasing or fixing dimensionality. But Riker’s lessons are 
more general. Skilful herestheticians outmanoeuvred political adversaries by 
redefining political situations, reframing policy alternatives, manipulating agendas, 
voting strategically, and changing the process by which collective decisions are 
taken.62 Indeed, heresthetic is essentially ‘the art of constructing choice situations so 
as to be able to manipulate outcomes’.63 In Riker’s words, it is about:   
 
                                                 
57
 Douglass North, ‘Economic Performance Through Time’, American Economic Review, 84 (1994): 
359-68, at p. 360. 
58
 Paul Pierson and Theda Skocpol, ‘Historical Institutionalism in Contemporary Political Science’, in 
Ira Katznelson and Helen Milner, eds, Political Science: The State of the Discipline (New York: 
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‘Setting up situations...in such a way that even those who do not wish to do so are compelled 
by the structure of the situation to support the heresthestician's purpose’.64  
 
One of the key arguments of this paper is that heresthetic is also about the strategic 
manipulation of institutions. Social decisions are made by aggregating the opinions of 
relevant people. New institutionalism contends that social outcomes depend as much 
on the procedure of aggregation as on the tastes of participants. If institutions mediate 
the relationship between preferences and outcomes, it is always possible to 
manipulate outcomes by redesigning institutions. In this context, the logic of 
heresthetic can inform the politics of institutional change.65 In certain moments of 
history, the introduction (or elimination) of dimensions involves the manipulation of 
institutional structures, as actors struggle to shape the mechanisms transforming 
preferences into outcomes in order to prevail in future political contests. Hence, 
heresthetical manoeuvres are a source of institutional change. However, while some 
politicians are strong on heresthetic, others not.66 We will see that this issue played a 
key role in explaining the evolution of bank independence in Britain. 
 
The concept of heresthetic is also a reminder that political agency matters in the 
process of institutional change. One way of incorporating agents into a model of 
institutional origins is to look at the behaviour of ‘political entrepreneurs’, who 
engage in institution building to make profits.67 Transforming institutions is costly 
though. Political entrepreneurs must invest time and energy in the design of 
institutions from which they seek to secure political gains. In the reminder of this 
section, we will discuss two types of motivations: (1) the notion of binding others and 
(2) the enabling functions of institutional precommitments.   
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From self-binding to binding others 
‘In politics, people never try to bind themselves, only to bind others’  
Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound 
 
The idea of self-binding is omnipresent in the credibility-based narratives explaining 
the choice of monetary arrangements. Several scholars have employed the metaphors 
of tying one's hands and burning own ships to describe the pre-commitment options 
available for achieving credibility in strategic interaction.68 These metaphors have 
been widely applied to account for the evolution of fiscal and monetary 
commitments.69 Correspondingly, Ulysses’ self-binding logic is often used to explain 
the rise of independent central banking. As one expert put it:   
 
‘Perhaps the principal reason why central banks are given independence from elected 
politicians is that the political process is apt to be too shortsighted. Knowing this, politicians 
willingly and wisely cede day-to-day authority over monetary policy to a group of 
independent central bankers who are told to keep inflation in check…The reasoning is the 
same as Ulysses’: He knew he would get better long-run results by tying himself to the mast, 
even though he wouldn’t always feel very good about it in the short run!’70  
 
The abusive use of the self-binding rhetoric leads to misleading interpretations of the 
political logic of institutional solutions to problems of credible commitment. 
Moreover, scholars writing on monetary commitments seem to be unaware of Elster’s 
important U-turn on the rationale of self-binding. In Ulysses Unbound, he explicitly 
revisits and reformulates some of the key arguments of his influential Ulysses and the 
Sirens. In particular, he argues that: ‘the transfer of concepts used to study individuals 
to the behaviour of collectivities, as if these were individuals writ large, can be very 
misleading’. For one thing, ‘constitutions may bind others rather than being acts of 
self-binding’.71 By removing the assumption that governments are unitary actors, 
Elster now claims that precommitment devices, like granting central bank 
independence, are not self-binding in an intentional sense. On the contrary, many 
                                                 
68Elster, Ulysses and the Sirens; Avinash Dixit and Barry Nalebuff, Thinking Strategically, New York: 
Norton, 1991); Kenneth Shepsle, ‘Discretion, Institutions and the Problem of Government 
Commitment’, in Paul Bourdieu and James Coleman, eds, Social Theory for a Changing Society, 
(Boulder: Western Press, 1991).   
69
 Giavazzi and Pagano, ‘The Advantage of Tying One's Hands’; Milesi-Ferretti, ‘The Disadvantage of 
Tying Their Hands’; Douglass North and Barry Weingast, ‘Constitutions and Commitments: The 
Evolution of Institutions Governing Public Choice in 17th Century England’, Journal of Economic 
History 19 (1989), 803-32; Hilton Root, ‘Tying the King’s Hands: Credible Commitments and Royal 
Fiscal Policy during the Old Regime, Rationality and Society, 1 (1989), 240-58. 
70
 Blinder, Central Banking in Theory and Practice, pp. 56-61, emphasis added. 
71
 Elster, Ulysses Unbound, p. 92, emphasis added. 
15 
 
alleged cases of self-binding institutions turn out, on a closer inspection, to confirm 
the dictum that in politics ‘people want to bind others, not themselves’.72  
 
More formally, Elster shows that self-binding entails the following four analytical 
options: (1) An agent A binds the same agent A (of course, most of the times A needs 
assistance from B to bind himself); (2) An agent B imposes a constraint on an agent 
A because A has asked him to do so; (3) An agent B binds A because B believe that 
A would have asked to be bound had he known all the facts about the case and been 
capable of making an informed decision; and (4) A person bind himself merely for 
the purpose of creating a constraint that will also limit the freedom action of others.73 
It is the last of these options that provides the most useful framework for 
understanding the Britain’s path to independence. By strategically delegating power, 
Gordon Brown did not want to bind himself. Instead, the institutional choice was 
meant to constrain potential challengers while simultaneously increasing the capacity 
of the Treasury to control other departments’ plans, enabling Brown to play a more 
powerful role than any previous Chancellor.  
Enabling political institutions   
‘Common sense suggests that it is always preferable to have more options than fewer…very 
often common sense fails... Sometimes it is simply the case that less is more; people may 
benefit from being constrained.’  
Jon Elster, Ulysses Unbound  
 
By reading too much into the self-binding metaphor, most works on credibility 
overestimate the constraining dimension of institutional commitments. Institutional 
constraints are not only about limiting power. Indeed, the democratic paradox of 
constitutional pre-commitment is that constraints can be power-enhancing. As James 
Madison famously claimed, constraints can promote freedom. In this context, 
Stephen Holmes argues that ‘precommitments are not disabling, but enabling’.74 In 
Douglass North’s terms, institutions reduce the transaction costs of certain exchanges 
by increasing the costs of engaging in certain forms of (undesirable) behaviour.   
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This dialectic relationship between the constraining and enabling features of 
government commitments refers to Thomas Schelling’s classic thesis: in strategic 
bargaining ‘weakness is often strength’.75 This enabling function reinforces the 
benefit-side of the ruler’s equation. Herestheticians are not seduced by discipline per 
se, but rather by the profits attached to the institutionalisation of discipline. 
 
Some classic works on political economy support the proposition that less is more in 
the creation of commitments through institutions. For example, North and Weingast 
show that a ‘fiscal boom’ was one of the outcomes of the constitutional reforms that 
took place during the Britain’s Glorious Revolution.76 Hilton Root’s research on 
France’s historical political economy also emphasises the enabling implications of 
tying one’s hands. He wrote: ‘the King supported the expansion of corporate society 
because corporate institutions enabled him to obtain credit’.77 We will see below that 
the logic of enabling political institutions can also inform the evolution of Gordon 
Brown’s prudence. In a curious way, the strategy of constrained discretion ended up 
liberating rather than binding the Treasury. The government was able to exploit 
unprecedented political and financial opportunities, creating the conditions for 
significant increases in government spending.           
The context of institutional choice  
The overriding aim of central bank independence is to induce low and stable levels of 
inflation. British inflationary history has been problematic. During the so-called post-
war settlement, governments put the emphasis on demand management through fiscal 
means with monetary policy performing a subordinate, supporting role.78 The 
stagflation of the mid-1970s dislocated this framework.  Inflation reached record 
levels in 1975, as Britain was particularly hit by the dismantling of the Bretton 
Woods system and oil crisis. The dramatic failure of traditional income policies to 
provide an adequate response to the new reality, epitomized in the IMF crisis of 1976 
and the winter of discontent of 1978/9, brought about a ‘new politics’ and a ‘new 
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policy paradigm’.79 In the context of the Thatcher revolution, the conquest of 
inflation – rather than unemployment – became the government’s new priority. 
Inflation was eventually controlled, helped by structural changes. However, endless 
disputes over monetary and exchange-rate policy (e.g. the quarrel between fixers and 
floaters) were one of the dominant features of the Conservative years.80 In the event, 
the ERM crisis of 1992 raised serious questions about both the consistency and 
appropriateness of Britain’s monetary framework.   
 
It is certainly tempting to explain the origins of central bank independence in Britain 
as the predictable outcome of its traumatic monetary history and politics of economic 
decline. However, this conclusion would be misleading. The shock in relative prices 
of the mid-1970s critically challenged the core beliefs underpinning the post-war 
British model of political economy. This belief cascade in turn led to a radical change 
in the institutional foundations of economic policy.  Actually, Britain experienced a 
‘movement from a Keynesian mode of policymaking to one based on monetarist 
economic theory’.81 It should be pointed out though that CBI was one among a range 
of monetary commitments that might have been consistent with monetarism and the 
rational-expectations revolution.82 And indeed the Conservatives sought alternative 
mechanisms to anchor their anti-inflation strategy, including money supply limits, 
external commitments and inflation targets.83 The founding fathers were also aware 
of the available options. In the words of Ed Balls, economic adviser to Gordon 
Brown:  
 
‘Of course, there is more than one route to stability for countries and regions – and different 
successful models of central bank independence – depending on their history, institutions and 
track record’.84  
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This argument also applies to the role of globalization. Many authors stress the 
importance of the processes of Europeanization and internationalization for 
explaining New Labour’s policy formation.85 It is probably true that globalization has 
created constrains on autonomous and discretionary economic policy,86 on the one 
hand, and incentives for delegation in the name of credibility, on the other. It is also 
probably true that New Labour’s leaders consciously sought to adapt to the pressures 
imposed by economic integration, financial liberalization and heightened capital 
mobility.87 However, it should be noted again that alternative institutional 
configurations, other than central bank independence, might have been consistent 
with the imperatives of globalization.  
 
Political economists largely focus on changes in economic relative prices to explain 
the emergence of fiscal and monetary rules. But political relative prices are important 
as well. New Labour faced powerful political incentives, both electoral and 
coalitional, to endorse the main tenets of the neo-liberal consensus in an attempt to 
recapture the political centre of British politics.88 Colin Hay shows that economic 
policy in general and monetary policy in particular were key elements of New 
Labour’s reckless ‘politics of accommodation’.89 Labour had to overcome the 
problem of being seen as the party of devaluation, inflation and high taxation.90 In a 
bid to signal that the party had learned the hard lessons of the past, its 1997 manifesto 
committed to macroeconomic stability, control of inflation and fiscal prudence. 
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Critically, Labour proposed ‘a robust and stable framework of monetary and fiscal 
discipline’.91  
 
The adoption of central bank independence in Britain cannot be fully explained by 
looking only at the economic and political underpinnings of New Labour, as most 
analysts implicitly do. At most, the structure of incentives described above affected 
the rational-choice calculations of the institutional framers by providing the context of 
decision. Those factors might have made possible a range of feasible options. They 
are hardly the essence of decision. Important puzzles remain. Why didn’t CBI, one of 
the flagship institutions of neo-liberalism, emerge during the height of conservative 
hegemony? Why didn’t this radical institutional change coincide with the rise of 
financial interests and the monetarist paradigm? If Blair and Brown wanted to use 
CBI to signal competence through repositioning, why didn’t they announce this 
radical reform before the election? In order to answer these questions, we should 
focus on the beliefs and motivations of the founding fathers.  
Bank of England reform as heresthetic  
‘The power to constrain an adversary may depend on the power to bind oneself…freedom 
may be freedom to capitulate, and to burn bridges behind one may suffice to undo an 
opponent’. 
Thomas Schelling, The Strategy of Conflict, p. 22 
Evolution? No, heresthetic! 
‘My intention is to lock into our policy making system a commitment to consistently low 
inflation in the long term.’  
Gordon Brown, ‘Remit for the Monetary Policy Committee’  
 
Actors maximize their goals by either changing their strategies under giving rules or 
by changing the institutions that transform their strategies into outcomes. Most of the 
time they do the former, but they may occasionally do the latter. They attempt to 
shape political outcomes by manipulating the rules of the game. As the many 
examples included in Iain McLean’s Rational Choice and British Politics show:  
 
‘Once in a while there comes a politician who sees further than the others. Such a politician 
can see opportunities where others do not, in opening up or closing down political 
dimensions. This may lead to the enactment of radical and unexpected policies. It may turn a 
                                                 
91
 Hay, The Political Economy of New Labour, p. 126. See also Tony Blair, ‘The Economic 
Framework for New Labour’, in Forrest Capie and Geofrrey Wood, eds, Policymakers on Policy: The 
Mais Lectures (London: Routledge, 2001), pp. 103-22.  
20 
 
persistently losing coalition into a winning coalition. It may save a party whose social base is 
eroding. It may protect a party from overstretch’.92    
 
Institutional reform is always an outcome of both evolution and design, a complex 
interaction of continuity and change, a blend of the old and the new. The making of 
central bank independence in Britain was not an exception. For some, it was a bold 
and radical reformulation of the monetary constitution. For others, it was simply the 
consolidation of the monetary arrangements introduced by Lamont following the 
ERM fiasco of 1992. In a lecture given to mark the first ten years of the Bank of 
England’s Monetary Policy Committee, Mervyn King, in his capacity of Governor of 
the Bank of England, played around the ambiguity between evolution and design as 
he claimed that, 
 
‘although the announcement in 1997 of independence for the Bank of England was a bolt 
from the blue, it was a long time in the making’.93  
 
However, in the very same paragraph King added that ‘granting independence to the 
Bank of England was the dramatic constitutional change that convinced financial 
markets of the United Kingdom’s conversion to stability as the basis of 
macroeconomic policy’ and that the decision was ‘both unexpected and far-reaching’. 
In another lecture given in 1999, King argued that ‘the Monetary Policy Committee 
has broken new ground in British constitutional history. In its three hundred year 
history probably no change has been as significant as operational independence and 
the creation of the Monetary Policy Committee’.94 According to Eddie George, this 
sweeping reform transformed the old Bank of England into the ‘The New Lady of 
Threadneedle Street’.95 Detailed analysis of yield curves on UK government bonds 
also showed that Brown’s announcement on 6 May 1997 was ‘a complete surprise to 
the financial markets’.96 It is evident that the key players perceived this reform as a 
turning point, a radical departure from existing practices and traditions.  
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Evolutionary accounts of the politics of central bank independence in Britain suggest 
that this was simply an idea whose time had come.97 But Brown’s largely unforeseen 
decision to move swiftly towards granting operational independence to the Bank of 
England was nevertheless hailed as ‘an audacious stroke’, ‘a political masterstroke’, a 
‘revolutionary move’, ‘a pre-emptive and brilliantly orchestrated manoeuvre’.98 The 
always well-informed Andrew Rawnsley argued that ‘expert and inexpert opinion 
agreed that Brown had pulled off an astonishing coup de théâtre and a strategic 
masterstroke’.99 This pivotal decision, not mentioned explicitly in the party 
manifesto,100 was announced only five days after the election. More tellingly, Brown 
deliberatively waited until the eve of polling day to discuss with Blair his intention to 
go for an early announcement of CBI. According to Rawnsley, this was partly tactics: 
‘it would give Blair little time to consult others who might be cool about the idea’.101 
It was both striking and illuminating that this decision – for many the biggest change 
in economic policymaking since the war – was not discussed in the Cabinet, let alone 
referred to a formal consultation process. As Brown thought that making the move 
quickly was essential, the project was presented to Eddie George on a take-or-leave-it 
basis.102 This ‘great political coup’103 had all the fingerprints of heresthetic.  
 
Iain McLean argued that the decisions to cede control over interest rates and to 
establish the golden rule to borrow only for government’s capital spending were 
indeed ‘heresthetic moves’.104 He suggested that the key motive behind the move was 
to avoid the blame when the economy goes wrong. The depoliticization literature has 
also assumed that New Labour surrendered control over monetary policy to evade 
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responsibility for unpopular decisions such as interest rate increases.105 Indeed, this 
motivation of avoiding the blame loomed large in both media analyses and 
parliamentary debates. And as might be expected, it was one of the preferred lines of 
argument used by Conservative MPs in the House of Commons. As Mr Lilley put it: 
 
‘the Bill is yet another example of the Government’s desire to remove power from the House 
and from elected representatives and give it away to appointed officials. They want to escape 
the blame for difficult decisions’.106 
 
Blame avoidance might have been one of the motives of the group around Gordon 
Brown. However, the strategic implications of the decision to surrender key tools for 
managing the economy were much broader. Heresthetic is about restructuring games 
to achieve political ends. Brown sought to reconstruct British political system by 
manipulating the institutions of economic decision-making. By removing monetary 
policy from the realm of party competition (fixing dimensionality in Riker’s 
analytics), Brown could achieve vital strategic aims. For one thing, he was able to 
consolidate his reputation for economic competence by sending the ultimate signal to 
the markets. For another, he bought a powerful institutional insurance for enforcing 
internal discipline and policy cohesiveness in the context of a coalition of groups 
within the Labour Party that was moving towards the right.  
It is widely accepted that Brown moved promptly towards independence in order to 
reassure markets about New Labour’s modern and business-friendly economic 
framework. This idea was surely in the mind of the founding fathers, who certainly 
use independence to signal a decisive break with the ‘old dogmas of the past’.107 But 
this strategic decision was not only about signalling change; it was mainly about 
enforcing change over time. Essentially, the institutional change aimed at reshaping 
the structure of the political economy game. The real objective was to enforce a new 
paradigm of economic policy. In his 2005 Mansion House speech, Brown said: ‘in 
the 1950s Britain managed decline, then in the 1960s we mismanaged decline and 
then in the 1970s we declined to manage. And our stop- go history is now legendary - 
so much part of our psychology that it was essential in 1997 to start a new chapter by 
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making the Bank of England independent’.108 In the same spirit, Balls admitted that 
the early move to independence provided, 
‘a unique opportunity to reshape the objectives, institutions and practice of British 
macroeconomic policy’.109 
William Keegan concluded his insightful chapter on the Bank of England reform with 
the following words: ‘the battleground simply moved’.110 This is precisely what 
heresthetic is all about; it is about reframing the rules of decision-making, and by 
implication, shifting the parameters of political competition. By changing 
dimensionality, the institutional framers sought to induce a more consensual approach 
to economic policy-making, attacking the roots of the pervasive conflicts of the past. 
Constitutional change was not only concerned with credibility, but also with 
legitimacy. According to Balls, ‘the new framework had to be capable of rebuilding 
and entrenching public support and establishing a new cross-party political and 
parliamentary consensus for long-term stability – a new consensus about goals and a 
new consensus about the institutional arrangements needed to deliver those goals’.111 
Brown believed that institutionalizing a new consensus was needed for moving 
beyond the ‘endless and sterile divisions between capital and labour, between state 
and market and between public and private sectors’.112 
Gordon Brown is not a typical heresthetician. Political entrepreneurs, who are active 
in the game of framing institutions, are usually people who strongly believe in the 
political power and the mediating role of institutions. Brown’s policies did not seem 
to be informed by the institutions-do-matter mantra. Actually, Brown’s interest in 
heresthetic comes from a different source, namely his ability and propensity to ‘think 
and act strategically’.113 As Keegan put it, ‘the MPC episode brought out Brown’s 
strategic and long-term approach’.114 Other commentators point out that the 
Chancellor was determined to make Labour’s conversion irreversible. Stephen argues 
that ‘if a single, overriding, feature defined the economic policy of the first Blair 
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government, it was the Chancellor’s construction of permanent monetary and fiscal 
frameworks to keep it in the path of virtue’.115 In Brown’s own words: 
   
‘Improving the institutional arrangements for economic policy will be accorded a high 
priority by the government in order to deliver long term economic stability and rising 
prosperity’.116  
 
In hindsight, it appears that Brown had clear incentives to alter the dimensionality of 
the economic policy game by shifting decision-making power from Whitehall to the 
Square Mile. But this begs the further question as to why this did not happen before? 
An article in the Financial Times nicely captured the reaction of the City. It stated: 
‘Mr Gordon Brown’s decision to give the Bank of England operational autonomy 
may have been unexpected. But it is welcome. It should have been taken by the 
Tories’.117 And indeed this radical institutional change should have been championed 
by the Conservatives in the name of sound money, financial stability and wage 
restraint. The Tories could have also delivered a pre-emptive strike and moved 
strategically towards independence just before leaving office. This would have locked 
in the interests of the Conservative coalition, just as Pinochet did in order to constrain 
the Chilean democratic transition. Intriguingly, they failed to do so. Why?      
Paths not taken 
In the period 1988-1997, the Conservative governments of Thatcher and Major 
seriously considered but eventually rejected a number of proposals for central bank 
independence.118 On November 1988, Chancellor Lawson sent a memo to Prime 
Minister Thatcher, proposing an independent Bank of England. The PM and the 
Chancellor had famously clashed over interest rates. In her memoirs, Mrs. Thatcher 
recalled: ‘I was always more sensitive to the political implications of interest rates 
rises – particularly their timing…Prime Ministers have to be. I was also acutely 
conscious of what interest rate changes meant for those with mortgages… I was 
cautious about putting up interest rates unless it was necessary’.119 In this context, 
Lawson contended that independence would strengthen the use of monetary policy to 
                                                 
115
 Stephen, The Treasury Under Labour, p. 189. 
116
 Gordon Brown, ‘Letter from the Chancellor to the Governor’, 6 May 1997. Printed in Bank of 
England Quarterly Bulletin, 37(3), August 1997. 
117
 Financial Times, 7 May 1997, emphasis added. 
118
 For a detailed discussion of these proposals, see Patel, ‘An Independent Bank of England’; Elgie 
and Thompson, The Politics of Central Banks.  
119
 Thatcher, The Downing Street Years, p. 698. 
25 
 
fight inflation, making the commitment to stable prices a permanent feature of British 
economic policy. He also argued that the change would enhance government’s ability 
to resist electoral pressures. Interestingly, he also pointed out strategic considerations: 
‘I was anxious above all to entrench our counterinflationary commitment and policies against 
the vagaries of future governments, possibly of a different political complexion’.120  
 
The proposal was turned down by Mrs. Thatcher, who believed that monetary policy, 
interest rates and the value of the pound were not technical affairs; they were rather at 
the heart of economic policy, if not quintessential to democratic politics.121 
Paradoxically, heresthetic considerations were probably behind her decision. She 
might have calculated that removing monetary issues from party political competition 
was bound to benefit Labour. According to Peston, a senior official of that 
government confessed that ‘she recognized that such a move would reduce the 
electorate’s fear of a Labour government’.122 A deliberate ‘non-decision’ of this sort 
was probably one of the motivations. However, cognitive considerations played a 
crucial role as well.  Would-be institutional reformers should be confident about the 
political power of institutions. Margaret Thatcher did not seem to share this belief. In 
her own words: 
‘My reaction was dismissive…I do not believe that changing well-tried institutional 
arrangements generally provides solutions to underlying political problems –and the control 
of inflation is ultimately a political problem’.123 
 
Chancellor Lamont and Prime Minister Major also clashed over monetary policy. 
Major wished to see interest rates ‘as low as possible, but my frustration was with 
delays in implementing cuts that were to be taken’.124 Following his predecessor, 
Lamont also proposed making the Bank of England independent.125 But Major, like 
Thatcher, also rejected the move. Major recalled: ‘Norman…wanted to grant 
independence to the Bank of England. I disliked this proposal on democratic grounds, 
believing that the person responsible for monetary policy should be answerable for it 
in the House of Commons. I also feared that the culture of an independent bank 
would ensure that interest rates went up rapidly but fell only slowly’.126 Again, 
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dimensionality seemed to be an issue. According to Lamont, one of the reasons why 
Major objected to CBI was because ‘people were frightened how Labour would 
handle monetary policy and he didn’t want to remove that fear’.127 Lamont launched 
a futile counterattack:  
‘I said there were some indications that Labour might move in the direction of independence, 
but the PM wouldn’t budge. Reluctantly I had to forget the idea’ (Lamont 1999: 325).  
 
The Conservatives were trapped in a strategic conundrum. While some key players 
(notably Lawson and Lamont) were persuaded about the potential gains of central 
bank independence, other players (notably Thatcher and Major) failed to see the 
benefits of removing monetary policy from the space of political competition. A 
further dimensionality problem undermined the position of the advocates of reform. 
Many observers viewed central bank independence as a step towards Europe, always 
a divisive issue within the Conservative coalition.128  
 
This analysis of the paths not taken stresses the role of Tony Blair as a founding 
father of central bank independence.  The conventional wisdom is that the decision 
was Brown’s and that Blair was simply notified of the change, rather than seriously 
contributing to it.129 However, the incoming Prime Minister could have emulated its 
predecessor and vetoed the proposal. By acquiescing to Brown’s strategy, he played a 
key role in the process of institutional formation. According to Rawnsley, Blair liked 
the boldness of the plan and enthused by the political dividend of winning the instant 
approval of the City.130 The reform was also consistent with many of Blair’s declared 
aims: appealing to the radical centre, disciplining the Labour party through 
modernization, and strengthening the centre of government.131  
 
This discussion reveals the limitations of evolutionary accounts of institutions based 
on relative price shocks or policy learning. There is a tendency to see bank 
independence as the end of a continuum that started with the 1992 ERM debacle. Yet 
nothing was inevitable. As Peston argues: ‘if the Tories had won the 1997 election, 
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they would not have given independence to the Bank’.132 The making of central bank 
independence in Britain stresses that, using Douglass North’s language, institutional 
change requires both intentionality and comprehension of the issues. The evolution of 
relative price shocks and ideas created opportunities for change. But crucially, those 
opportunities were seized by the decisive action of a group of strategically-oriented 
politicians. On the other hand, some groups that would eventually profit from the 
institutionalization of discipline failed to take decisive steps to promote change, 
probably because they did not perceive the ultimate benefits of the reform.   
 
The following anecdote highlights the importance of intentionality. Having made the 
decision about Bank of England reform very soon after the election, Brown, who had 
only quite recently been converted to the independence cause,133 called Lamont to 
reveal his plans. When Lamont picked up the phone, he heard Brown saying: ‘we 
have decided to take your advice’. Lamont commented that ‘it wasn’t my advice of 
course, it was their own decision.134 He probably felt intellectually satisfied, but 
politically outplayed. The Conservatives enforced the monetarist paradigm in Britain, 
but ironically failed to deliver one of its flagship institutions. Ultimately, they were 
outmanoeuvred by their political opponents. By deciding to play the CBI card, New 
Labour unambiguously signalled their competence on issues of economic 
management and thereby radically reshaped the structure of the economic policy 
game. 
 
The parliamentary debate over the 1998 Bank of England Act suggests that Brown’s 
bid to manipulate dimensionality was successful. The Conservatives looked 
disconcerted. Mr. Lilley claimed that: ‘controlling inflation by interest policy is a 
technical matter than cannot simply be handed over to a group of experts. It involves 
considerable discretion, and that discretion affects people’s livelihoods, their jobs, the 
value of their savings, the viability of their businesses and the burden of their 
debts’.135 Former Chancellor Ken Clarke argued that ‘hitting the inflation target can 
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be damaging to the levels of unemployment and growth’.136 Clifton-Brown 
complained that ‘bankers are always cautious. The proposal is therefore likely to be 
deflationary’.137 Surreally, the Tories were favouring discretion and concerned about 
the implications of the reform for growth and unemployment. The heresthetic 
manoeuvre definitively turned the world upside down.138  
 
In order to maximize support, herestheticians engage in the ‘strategic use of 
rhetoric’.139 This proved to be the case during the Bank of England reform. While 
most nonpartisan commentators cited the experiences of New Zealand, the US and 
above all Germany to illustrate the potential payoffs of independence, Brown 
preferred to frame the reform as ‘a British solution to meet British needs’.140 He also 
claimed that ‘this is a long-term policy for long-term prosperity’141 and that ‘the new 
monetary arrangements will form part of our wider strategy to improve the 
performance of the British economy in the long term’.142 So much for the long term. 
As Lord Keynes reminded us, in the long run we are all dead. What about the short-
term gains of this institutional reform? Herestheticians would prefer not openly talk 
about them. But they are vitally important nonetheless.  
Gordon Unbound: the politics of self-binding revisited  
Self-binding? No, binding others! 
‘I am cutting the politicians and the politics out of setting interest rates’  
Gordon Brown, The Sun, 7 May 1997 
 
Economists tend to emphasise the welfare gains of institutional precommitments. 
However, they rarely discuss the political rationale of voluntary self-binding. Why, 
and under which conditions, a self-interested politician willingly sacrifices freedom 
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of action in favour of technocratic institutions? Politicians adopt precommitment 
strategies only if they can realize effective political profits.  
 
Gordon Brown and his advisers claimed that the new institutional arrangements 
would enhance significantly the ‘credibility of UK monetary policy’.143 Credibility is 
an elusive concept though. It is partly about promoting macroeconomic consistency 
by realigning inter-temporal incentives. But credibility also has important political 
dimensions. After all, the strategy of Ulysses applied to the design of monetary 
institutions is ‘to entrust economic policy to persons that will not be tempted by the 
Sirens of partisan politics’.144 This means that the pressures undermining the 
credibility of economic policies stem from the dynamics of public opinion and the 
demands of intra-party coalition-building. Governments are not unitary actors. And 
they are constantly faced with severe common-pool resource problems.  
 
There are two competing arguments about the political dimension of credibility. On 
the one hand, Bernhard suggests that bank independence sought to increase cabinet 
stability by removing intra-party conflicts over monetary policy.145 On the other 
hand, King claims that the British case does not provide support to the coalitional 
hypothesis because ‘only a few leftists remained in the Labour party… [so] Blair and 
Brown did not fear a threat from Labour backbenchers against their policies’.146 In 
the light of the empirical evidence, Bernhard’s case carries greater weight. The 
heresthetic move was perceived by it proponents within the Labour Party as a 
political weapon for enforcing policy changes and party discipline in a coalition 
moving right. King’s position is not entirely consistent with the large scholarship on 
the cognitive and political underpinnings of New Labour. A consistent view emerges 
from this literature that Blair and Brown were obsessed with exorcising the past and 
strengthening the grip of the core executive. As Philip Stephens clearly put it:  
 
‘The failure of his party’s past loomed large. Brown had seen too many Labour Chancellors 
lurch from profligate post-election boom to fatal pre-election bust. Stability, rules, discipline, 
prudence, transparency: the mantras were more than election slogans. They were the means 
by which the New Labour government would exorcise the past. The party, as Blair would 
often remind his colleagues, had never secured two full terms in office. It had foundered 
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instead on the rocks of successive economic crises. Stafford Cripps in 1948, James Callaghan 
in 1967, Denis Healey in 1976- all had been humiliated by the financial markets. The sterling 
crises in those years had been symptom as much as a cause of the failure of self-discipline. 
Subsequent elections defeats were proof that the Labour way of governing had been bad 
politics as well as bad economics’.147 
 
Since 1994, the architects of New Labour promoted radical programmatic, 
organizational and symbolic changes aimed at signalling an unmistakable break with 
the past.148 Moreover, they endorsed a reckless politics of accommodation, even at 
the risk of overshooting the position of the median voter.149 Notwithstanding its large 
parliamentary majority, the newly elected leaders wanted to avoid the fate suffered by 
past Labour governments. Andrew Rawnsley’s books show that Blair and Brown 
were obsessed with proving their competence by pleasing the markets and finding 
ways of enforcing internal discipline. This thinking shaped the politics of central 
bank independence. As Ed Balls confessed:  
‘Establishing and retaining credibility is important for any central bank or government – but  
particularly for a new government from a political party which has been out of power for 
almost two decades and which has seen substantial changes in its party constitution and 
policy in a short space of years’.150  
 
Self-binding is the dominant narrative in most accounts of bank independence in 
Britain. As an article put it, ‘by tying his hands to an independent monetary policy, 
Mr Brown should be able to avoid those perennial financial crises that have 
bedevilled previous Labour governments’.151 Tying his hands? Actually this was not 
an act of self-binding in an intentional sense. Moreover, this self-binding rhetoric is 
at odds with conventional views regarding Gordon Brown’s decision-making style. 
Brown had a determination to maximize his authority at the expense of others.152 This 
apparent paradox regarding Brown’s behaviour can be resolved by realising that 
governments are not unitary actors, but coalitions of conflicting interests and ideas. 
Once we move from the logic of individual to collective choice, precommitment 
strategies are about binding others, rather than acts of self-binding.  By formally tying 
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his hands, Brown really intended to bind others.153  Following Elster’s logic, he 
formally bound himself merely for the purpose of creating a constraint that would 
also limit the freedom of action of others.  
 
Then, whose hands? The markets and the media supported the move because they 
fully understood that the reform aimed at binding politicians, including sectors of 
Brown’s own party. The Chancellor did not hide this intention. In several speeches, 
he argued that ‘interest rate decisions will be free from any political influence’ and 
that ‘we must remove the suspicion that short-term party political considerations are 
influencing the setting of interest rates’.154 In a speech at the CBI national conference, 
Brown pleased the audience by saying that: ‘the perception that monetary policy 
decisions have been dominated by short-term political considerations has grown. I 
believe we are agreed it is right to take these decisions out of politics, and to free 
them from short-term political pressures’.155 Stephens also highlights that ‘at the core 
of Brown’s approach was the conviction that Britain’s sad record of postwar 
economic mismanagement showed that politicians could not be trusted’.156  
 
Which politicians were targeted by the strategic move? The Sun pointed, maliciously, 
to Old Labour:  ‘Brown’s brilliant bid to defy Lefties’.157 An article in The Guardian 
also argued that the reform ‘cuts the new government adrift of all the Old Labour 
expectations like public sector unions expecting favours. In future the chancellor will 
be able to say it’s not within his power to make special cases: the Bank rules’.158 In 
the same line, Mr Lilley claimed: ‘they want to remove any influence from Labour 
Back Benchers, whose demands for higher spending and laxer policy have wrecked 
every previous Labour Government’.159 Another Conservative MP stated:  
 
‘The Chancellor and his senior colleagues must hope that the change will provide him with a 
defence against his Back Benchers, who will not be as cringing in their parliamentary 
behaviour as they have been so far. When things start to go wrong on the economic front, as 
undoubtedly they will in the nature of things, and when unemployment starts rising, as 
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undoubtedly it will at some point in the cycle, I hope that Labour Back Benchers will not 
allow themselves to be bought off with the excuse that the measures causing unemployment 
are not in the control of the Government but are the responsibility of the hard-hearted people 
on the Monetary Policy Committee of the Bank of England.’160  
 
Stories about left-leaning Labour MPs’ discontent over the reform attracted some 
attention, mainly during the debate of the Bank of England Act. In the House of 
Commons, Diane Abbott complained that: ‘It was remarkable to see a Labour 
government elected in triumph with the biggest majority since the war, within 
days…hand over one of the most important levers of economic policy to an unelected 
quango’.161 According to Mr Austin Mitchell, the institutional choice implied that:  
 
‘The Government are now giving up power to an oligarchy whose interest point in the 
opposite direction of those of the people.’  
 
The Old Labour issue has probably been overstated. The politics of interest rate 
setting in Britain is uniquely complex.162 We should remember that Thatcher and 
Major (not exactly Lefties), concerned about the reaction of small businesses and 
people with mortgages, were too willing to accommodate demands for lower interest 
rates.163 In the US and even in pro-stability Germany, politicians and central bankers 
have also engaged in fierce arguments about monetary policy.164 We should also 
remember that governments face pervasive collective action problems which 
compromise sound public finances. One journalist argued that ‘the chancellor has 
armed himself with a potent new reason to resist demands from spending 
ministers’.165 The intellectual master of the reform was fully aware of the importance 
of protecting the Chancellor from civil servants and other ministers. In his now 
famous Euro-Monetarism, Balls argued:  
‘No one has mastered the art of boom-bust economics better than the British 
Treasury…Power to set monetary policy remains in the hands of government ministers and 
unaccountable Treasury civil servants who seem to be able to live on despite their errors, 
while hapless Chancellors take the blame’.166  
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Brown not only faced pressures from party insiders and spending ministers, but also 
demands from interest groups. One of his biographers explained that ‘his study of 
twentieth-century had convinced him that good policies and ideas were often derailed 
by interests groups and the pressures of the moment…This conclusion permeated his 
entire strategy’.167 The group around Brown knew that pressures would not not only 
be exerted by the unions, who tend to be the usual suspects. Business  interests could 
also exert strong pressure on Chancellors. Richard Lambert, CBI’s Director General, 
repeatedly demanded the Bank of England to keep interest rates as low as possible to 
support economic activity.168 The new Chancellor had strong reasons for trying to 
bind vested interests through political manipulation. In doing so, he was also 
constraining the Tories, which would find it more difficult to strategically use their 
influence over market actors to bully the Labour government. 
 
Interest group dynamics were also important because a commitment to increasing 
productivity was one of the pillars of New Labour’s political economy169 and CBI 
would be inextricably linked to the politics of wage bargaining.170 Euro-Monetarism 
provided an interesting discussion of Britain’s poor record of wage restraint. Balls 
argued that wage restraint should be a central element of a non-monetarist economic 
policy. He stated: ‘the independent central bank should pay, and state that is paying, 
particular attention to the rate average earnings inflation in setting monetary policy. If 
employers and workers ignore the public interest and push settlements higher, then 
the Bank would have to raise interest rates’.171 In his 1999 Mais Lecture, Brown 
outlined New Labour’s approach to industrial relations: 
 
‘The Bank of England have to meet an inflation target of 2.5 per cent. The target has to be 
met. Unacceptably high wage rises will not therefore lead to higher inflation but higher 
interest rates. It is in no one's interest if today's pay rise threatens to become tomorrow's 
mortgage rise. So wage responsibility - to rescue a useful phrase from a woeful context- is a 
price worth paying to achieve jobs now and prosperity in the long term. It is moderation for a 
purpose.’172  
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Constraining? No, enabling! 
‘Central bank independence liberated the Treasury’  
Ed Balls, Delivering Economic Stability  
 
Binding others was clearly a powerful incentive in the calculation of the founding 
fathers. But the institutionalization of discipline involved other political benefits. 
According to Elster, precommitment is justified ‘because, rather than merely 
foreclosing options, it makes available possibilities which would otherwise lie 
beyond reach’.173 This is Schelling’s old lesson: in bargaining, weakness is often 
strength. Robert Peston, in his authoritative Brown’s Britain, brilliantly captured this 
strategic dimension of the institutional move. He argues:   
 
‘Brown’s eureka was to recognize that less is more, that to give up some responsibilities -
notably the control of interest rates, but also important areas of financial regulation, such as 
oversight of insurance companies – would reinforce the powers that matter’.174 
 
Peston’s remarks refer to the paradox of institutional precommitment. As Holmes 
argues, a voluntary abdication of power can be power-enhancing. Self-binding 
institutions are not only constraining; they are also enabling.175 Brown was not 
necessarily persuaded by the constraining, but he was surely keen on the enabling. 
Ironically, he bought some real freedom by sacrificing some formal powers. One 
effect of the reform was ‘to give Brown and the Treasury greater independence from 
Downing Street and far greater authority over other departments’.176 As Lee put it, 
‘by ceding responsibility for monetary policy to the Bank of England’s Monetary 
Policy Committee (MPC), the Treasury was given the space and opportunity to 
intervene, in a way unprecedented in peacetime, in economic and social policy. The 
creation of the MPC made possible the new developmental role for the Treasury’.177  
 
The empowerment of Brown’s Treasury through ‘constrained discretion’ was not 
only rhetorical.178 It had real effects. One government official argued that 
‘independence strengthened the Treasury’s hand more generally in respect of 
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economic policy, fiscal policy, public spending and the minimum wage. In the old 
days, the Treasury sanction was not a credible threat. But suddenly we were in a 
position where we could say: If you do that and it is perceived as imprudent, well the 
Monetary Policy Committee might raise interest rates. It’s out of our hands’.179 In the 
same line, Ed Balls observed that ‘far from weakening the ability of the Treasury to 
ensure public spending discipline, the risk that the Monetary Policy Committee might 
respond with a rate rise has proved a useful and effective deterrent to profligate 
departmental proposals on more than one occasion’.180 One analyst put it this way:  
‘previous Labour governments had felt captured by the Treasury, Brown captured the 
Treasury’.181 
 
In the same vein, Rawnsley argues that Gordon Brown ‘was less interested in 
operating the levers of macro-economic management than any previous incumbent in 
the Treasury, and independence for the Bank would be both a confidence-building 
marker with the markets and offer more freedom to devote himself to the structural, 
social and employment reform that really engaged the new Chancellor’.182 Peston 
also shows that ‘there have been other examples of Brown and the Treasury being 
empowered by the imposition of rules or reforms that appeared to limit their own 
freedom’ - notably the golden rules and the five tests for the single currency.183  
Herestheticians know that binding commitments can play positive roles, ultimately 
enhancing policy capacity. Balls and O’Donnell clearly knew this too:  
‘Central bank independence liberated the Treasury. Handing over the monthly process of 
decision-making on interest rates…created the time, space and long-term credibility for the 
Chancellor and senior Treasury management to concentrate on other levers of economic 
policy and the Government’s wider economic objectives.’184 
 
We might risk falling into the functionalist trap, explaining the emergence of a given 
institution on the basis of its results. However, some evidence suggests that Team 
Brown fully understood ex ante  the strategic benefits of delegation. In his 1992 
Fabian pamphlet, Ed Balls defended independence by emphasizing that a more 
transparent, accountable and predictable monetary policy would enhance credibility, 
meaning that ‘a Labour chancellor would be free to concentrate on many other 
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aspects of policy’.185 According to one commentator, Ball’s explicit message to 
Brown was:  
‘You should make the Bank independent. You should lose control in order to gain control’.186 
 
Remarkably, the founding fathers did not try to hide this fundamental dimension of 
institutional reform. On the contrary, they were unusually candid about the enabling 
implications of ‘making Labour credible’.187 It is often forgotten that Balls’s earlier 
writings aimed at denouncing the perils of a rigid rules-based approach to monetary 
policy. His central argument was that both the domestic and European brands of 
monetarism, which sought to link inflation expectations to intermediate monetary 
targets and to a one-size-fits-all German monetary policy respectively, were 
economically and politically misconceived.188 Both Brown and Balls rejected the 
simplistic idea that governments could achieve credibility by tying themselves to 
fixed monetary rules.189 They also contended that ‘the answer is not no rules, but the 
right rules’.190 Thus a post-monetarist path to stability should allow for both 
discretion and flexibility. As Brown repeatedly argued:  
‘In an open economy the discretion necessary for effective economic policy is possible only 
within a framework that guarantees the public interest is met, one that commands public trust 
and market credibility.’  
 
‘In the era of open capital markets, it is only within a credible framework that governments 
will command the trust to exercise the flexibility they require’.191  
 
Many commentators have failed to understand the cognitive and motivational 
nuances of this institutional choice. The institutional designers were not seeking to 
buy credibility by tying themselves to the mast of a strict binding commitment, as 
advocated by Giavazzi and Pagano. On the contrary, Balls was concerned with 
finding ways of ‘escaping the straitjacket of ERM and EMU’, including its 
deflationary effects.192 Similarly, they were not uncritically embracing the central 
tenets of neoliberalism. They were rather interested in building flexibility into the 
system. In a lecture in which he denounced the ‘failures of monetarism’ and the 
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rigidity of the Stability and Growth Pact, Balls declared that a clear pre-commitment 
to credible institutional arrangements should ‘allow the necessary flexibility so that 
policy can respond in the short-term to surprise economic events’.193 Brown’s 
economic framework was less about constraining and more about enabling than is 
often assumed. Indeed, the constraining element of the much-discussed ‘constrained 
discretion’ concept was only incorporated by Balls following a suggestion made by 
Mervyn King.194 This is hardly surprising. While the central banker was interested in 
constraining politicians, the economist political operator was keen on buying 
flexibility through pre-commitment.  
 
The enabling features of institutional commitment may be the key to understanding 
some of the tensions associated with Brown’s chancellorship. Earlier assessments of 
his policies put the emphasis on prudence.195 In its first term in office, New Labour 
broadly honoured its pre-election budget pledges and introduced the so-called golden 
rules establishing that over the economic cycle the government would only borrow to 
invest and that public debt would be held at a stable level.196 The enactment of CBI 
was also supposed to induce budget discipline. This new macroeconomic framework 
enforced tight budgets in the early years. However, over time the corset was loosened 
and then removed altogether. In History of Modern Britain, Andrew Marr remarks 
that ‘perhaps the most striking aspect of Brown’s running of the economy was the 
stark, dramatic shape of public spending. For his first two years he stuck fiercely to 
the promise he had made about continuing Conservative spending levels…Then there 
was an abrupt and dramatic shift and public spending soared, particularly on 
health…So there were the lean years followed by the fat years, famine then feast, 
squeeze then relax’.197 Fiscal policy was ‘tight in the first years of New Labour but 
loosened significantly in subsequent years’.198 This fiscal cycle led to the prudence 
for a purpose narrative.199 As one commentator put it: 
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Indeed, the early [fiscal and monetary] restraint was ‘to allow Brown, over time, to spend 
more than if he had splurged initially and then had been forced to tighten his belt, which had 
been the fate of his Labour predecessors at 11 Downing Street’.200  
 
As in many other historical experiences, the institutionalization of monetary 
discipline involved a critical fiscal dimension. Opening financial opportunities was 
one of the cornerstones of the strategy of constrained discretion. As Ben Clift and Jim 
Tomlinson have lucidly argued, New Labour’s decisive pursuit of market credibility 
‘was expressly concerned to create some space for fiscal activism’.201 The mechanism 
was the following: as potential owners of government bonds thought inflation would 
be lower, they started paying more for government debt, freeing up the Chancellor to 
spend more while keeping taxes down.202 This implies that, by strengthening 
monetary and fiscal governance, New Labour ended up creating conditions for a huge 
increase in education and health spending. Again, this is not a functionalist 
speculation. A Labour MP made the following point in the parliamentary debate: 
   
‘Gavyn Davis, the chief economist at Goldman Sachs, has estimated that, if yields on long 
bonds fall eventually by a full point, the Government’s funding costs will be reduced by 
about 3.5 million. The sum could be invested in the economy and could be used for extra 
public spending. A fall in bond yields would also reduce the cost of investment for private 
investment for private investors, and hence boost the economy in that way’.203  
 
Back in May 1997, most analysts assumed that an independent central bank implied a 
more prudent fiscal policy. As one newspaper remarked: ‘the chancellor is more 
likely to follow a sensible fiscal policy if he has good reason to expect monetary 
policy will not accommodate it than if he can make it do so’.204 However, the Bank of 
England reform ended up giving Brown ‘more freedom to tax and spend’.205 In the 
context of enhanced credibility, both public and private borrowing soared, 
compromising financial sustainability. Eventually, New Labour policies came full 
circle, from prudence to increasing public and private imprudence.206 The paradox of 
constitutional commitments squares the prudence and the prudence-for-a-purpose 
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narratives. It has been suggested that Brown was able to be a real socialist because he 
previously won the confidence of the financial markets.207 In the logic of heresthetic, 
he could afford to do it because he previously reshaped the structure of the political 
game by manipulating the monetary constitution. But prudence for a purpose was not 
an unintended consequence of the institutional move. It was the natural implication of 
the successful implementation of an enabling precommitment strategy. As Brown 
once claimed: ‘this extra public spending comes not at the expense of prudence but 
because of our prudence’.208 Gordon was not bound, but unbound!  
 
To sum it up, the making of central bank independence in Britain was underpinned by 
typical New Labour strategic thinking. The attempt to institutionalize a ‘post-
monetarist approach to economic policy’209 was based on a peculiar reading of the 
evolution of economic ideas and changes in the world economy.210 It was also based 
on an explicit attempt to move beyond ‘the old methods of old left or old right’,211 
squaring the circle between the seemingly irreconcilable Friedman and Keynes.212 In 
this framework, achieving credibility and stability were not aims, but only means to 
an end. Gordon Brown repeatedly argued that central bank independence was not the 
government’s main objective. Tellingly, he began his Mais Lecture by saying: ‘my 
first words from the Treasury, as I became Chancellor and announced the 
independence of the Bank of England, were to reaffirm, for this Government, our 
commitment to the goal first set out in 1944 of high and stable levels of growth and 
employment’.213 In other words, traditional values in a modern setting.  
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Conclusions and implications  
‘Looking at historical situations or tempering formal models through empirical analysis is the 
best way to understand ourselves and the world in which we live.’  
Norman Schofield, ‘Constitutional Political Economy’, p. 299 
 
This article combines theory and historical narratives to explain a seminal 
constitutional change in contemporary Britain. The main argument is that Gordon 
Brown’s surprise decision to change the British monetary constitution in 1997 was an 
act of political manipulation in a Rikerian sense. Conceptualizing the Bank of 
England reform as a heresthetic move throws new light on the motivations of New 
Labour. The political strategists deliberately removed an unpleasant issue from party 
politics in order to signal governing competence and enforce a new model of political 
economy. But we have observed that the institutional choice was not self-binding in 
an intentional sense. Indeed, Brown adopted a pre-commitment strategy to bind 
others, including members of his own government and powerful interest groups. 
Similarly, the reform was not driven by the logic of constraining. On the contrary, the 
institutionalization of discipline sought to achieve in-built flexibility through 
constrained discretion, enabling the Chancellor to achieve important economic and 
political goals. All these findings are well grounded in extant empirical evidence to 
date; but they are also subject to revision in the light of alternative interpretations of 
available evidence or the emergence of new evidence.214 
 
Theories of endogenous institutions are still underdeveloped,215 probably because 
there is an element of contingency regarding the sufficient causes of rapid change.216 
Yet we can still identify patterns of political behaviour through the study of crucial 
instances of institutional development. This research confirms that there should not 
be a distinction between in-period choices (choices given rules) and constitutional 
choices (choices about the rules) as far as politicians’ motivations are concerned. The 
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idea of a ‘pristine design stage’ is a myth.217 If anything, incentives for political 
manipulation are higher during constitutional moments. Politicians can obtain 
substantive benefits by manipulating the mechanisms transforming preferences into 
outcomes. This implies that the concept of heresthetic has leverage beyond the sphere 
of electoral competition. This concept crucially induces us to focus on the intentions 
and beliefs of a small group of strategic-oriented politicians who consciously seek to 
profit from reshaping the structure of political games. Decisions over interest rates 
have massive distributive implications, not least in Britain. In this context, it is 
striking that the main proponents of price stability did not manage to make the Bank 
of England independent during the Conservative era. This further confirms that policy 
suppliers have a great deal of influence in the constitution-making process.  
 
This article speaks to current debates about institutions and credibility, central bank 
independence, and the relationship between monetary and fiscal governance. The 
dominant story about the merits of self-binding and the credibility gains from 
depoliticizing monetary commitments may risk obscuring the politics of institutional 
change. Self-binding is a strategic hook aimed at outmanoeuvring adversaries. 
Politicians design institutionally binding credible commitments in order to bind 
others rather than themselves. Insofar as commentators have recognized the power of 
argument about e binding others, it tends to be made with reference future 
governments. This research suggests that binding others is also a strategic option to 
enforce the cohesiveness of ruling coalitions in a transition context. In the British 
case, Brown surrendered key policy tools with the objective of creating a constraint 
that would limit the freedom of potential challengers. Institutionalized commitments 
are also power-enhancing. Politicians, even the Gordon Browns of this world, are not 
interested in self-discipline, but in the political profits associated with the 
institutionalization of discipline. These two motivations – binding others and 
enabling – may help us understand why politicians delegate power to technocratic 
institutions, complementing explanations based on epistemic communities and 
depoliticization.  
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Greater central bank independence has emerged in the last decades as the paradigm of 
good economic governance.218 This monetary consensus should not be taken for 
granted though. Both the theoretical and empirical cases for independence are not 
uncontroversial. Works documenting an apparent association between CBI and low 
inflation are still undermined by causality issues, measurement errors, omitted-
variable biases and sampling problems.219 More importantly, the effects of central 
bank independence on inflation may be contingent on countries’ underlying political 
and societal constraints.220 The new monetary orthodoxy entails significant 
‘institutional paradoxes’.221 Finally, the logics of delegation and democratic 
accountability are not easily reconciled.222 These remaining uncertainties call for 
more in-depth and context-specific analysis of the evolution and implications of 
monetary institutions. This case study has shown that the cognitive and political 
underpinnings of central banking reforms are more nuanced than often suggested.   
 
Economists assume that hard monetary commitments would enforce budget 
discipline. But history shows that institutional innovations aimed at controlling 
rulers’ discretion may induce financial revolutions which relax the existing budget 
constraints of private and public agents.223 In the worst case scenario, the politics of 
cheap money leads to a financial disaster. Examples are not in short supply. In 
Argentina, an ultra-hard monetary arrangement created the conditions for an 
unsustainable financial bubble which burst tragically in December 2001. In Greece, 
the combination of the single currency with independent national budget policies 
encouraged fiscal profligacy, leaving the country on the verge of financial 
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meltdown.224 In the UK, the conscious pursuit of credibility through constrained 
discretion facilitated fiscal activism225 and fuelled an unhealthy housing boom. The 
established thinking has typically argued that the problem was not the monetary 
frameworks, but too expansionary fiscal policies. Yet this article suggests that the 
softening of budget constraints were not unintended consequences, but intrinsic to the 
making of constitutional commitments. This argument may contribute to the debate 
about the contradictions and limits inherent in the New Labour project.226 
  
I wish to conclude by saying that the crucial anomalies brought about by the current 
financial crisis should ideally encourage a rethinking of the role of institutions on 
economic policy-making.227 Are monetary institutions really solving problems of 
credible commitment, or simply reallocating them?228 Is there an institutional fix to 
politics? What are the limits of using external commitments to induce domestic 
discipline?229 What is the role of institutional complementarities, including the 
interactions between monetary, fiscal and financial governance? All these issues must 
be seriously addressed in further research. 
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